This is the thread devoted to the debate that Michael Flowers and Moral Atheist have agreed to undertake.  The rules for the debate are posted here and here is a link to the thread commenting about the judges and the rules.

The resolution for this debate is: "This debate is an argument on the rationality, consistency, and justifiability of morality from Moral Atheist's worldview. MA is free to attack the worldview of Michael Flowers, but is under no such obligation (as Flowers is the one who asserts that MA's worldview is not rational, consistent, or justifiable concerning morality)."

OPENING STATEMENT:

My worldview is Christianity. I believe that morals are defined for us and given to us by God. These morals represent or reflect God's good and holy character and have been summarized in the ten commandments. They are, at least in theory, objective. However, because of human sinfulness their objectivity is often obscured and questioned. God's "moral code" is communicated to all mankind through an indiscriminate general revelation from God; it is as though they are imprinted on our very nature. But again, because of human sinfulness this revelation often gets obscured, distorted and questioned. Special revelation (e.g. Scripture) has been given as a guide and commentary to help us verify and properly understand what we take to be God's moral code. Even this more distinct revelation can be obscured, distorted and questioned, however, because of human sinfulness. That is why ultimately one must rely on divine illumination if he or she hopes to arrive at a true sense of morality.

God provides grace that is sufficient for any human being to live a moral life. I speak here of theological morality as well as social morality. This grace helps curb human sinfulness and maintain social order in the world. By definition, however, it never actually effects salvation or brings about a full-fledged kind of morality in the life of an individual. It is distinguished in this regard from efficacious grace which, by definition, does effect salvation and bring about a full-fledged kind of morality in the life of an individual.

Well shoot, I should have just let Moral Atheist debate himself since he’s already exposed his morality as being completely untenable. Just so people will understand his position, I’ve copied a little snippet from Wikipedia.org which defines the term “ignosticism”:

Ignosticism (often confused with apathetic agnosticism or apatheism) is the view that the question of the existence of God is scientifically meaningless because it has no verifiable (or testable) consequences and should therefore be ignored. The form of the word ignosticism indicates an ignorance of what is meant by a claim of God's existence. Until this ignorance is cleared up, the ignostic is justified in ignoring putative arguments for or against. The consistent ignostic, therefore, awaits a coherent definition God (or of any other metaphysical concept to be discussed) before engaging in arguments for or against.

The problem with Ron’s position is that he cannot possibly hold to it consistently, any more than David Hume could consistently hold to his epistemological skepticism. Ron can say all he wants that he’s a metaphysical skeptic, but notice how he procedes to base and define his morality in strict materialistic terms. It sure sounds as though he's already committed to a strictly materialist view of reality.

If he’s going to argue morality then he ought to be a little more candid and actually acknowledge his position. He can’t have his cake and eat it too.

Don’t pretend you don’t have to make a commitment, Ron. It’s quite impossible to concoct a working moral theory without having some sort of epistemology to base it on. And your epistemology will necessarily depend on your metaphysical position.


--(For those who may not understand this terminology, epistemology is a theory of knowledge. It asks, “How do we know what we know?” Metaphysics deals with the nature of reality. It asks questions like, “What is man?”, “Do we have free will?”, “Do we have a mind?”, “What is a person?”, “Does God exist?”, “Does anything exist besides the physical universe?” etc.)--


So tell me, Ron, what is man? Are we something more than extensions of the physical universe, behavioristically driven by physico-chemical reactions? What differentiates us from the animals or from other material objects? Do you believe we have free will? Do you believe in the concept of person-hood? I would like to know how on earth you can propose any viable theory of morality without addressing these sorts of questions. Concerning those things of which you cannot speak you ought to remain silent, right? So why are you even bothering to debate morality?

If you continue appealing to ignorance on these matters then I’ll just have to force the issues and you’ll end up looking really silly.

Actually though, I anticipate that you will continue making your naïve and disingenuous appeals to ignorance with respect to metaphysical issues, claiming that sometimes you arbitrarily hold to one theory and sometimes to another. But I’m not going on a wild goose hunt, nor do I feel like I even need to. I can judge your position on its own merits, without any concern for what you personally are open to on the topic of metaphysics. I only have to critique the position you’ve presented, not some hypothetical position that you may or may not be committed to. You presented your theory as if you were a materialist, saying that the only “truths” you’re willing to accept are those that are empirically verifiable (i.e. observational, based on sense experience). Your theory therefore assumes that all non-empirically based metaphysical theories are irrelevant—at least from the standpoint of defining and elaborating on morals. It really doesn’t matter then what other metaphysical outlooks you might secretly tolerate or adhere to. In practice you are a materialist and that’s how I intend to judge your theory. Moral theory isn’t pure theory after all. It’s practical.

So let’s see if you have a working moral theory that is consistent, justifiable and rational.


By the way, when you say that metaphysical theories are irrelevant to our discussion you are already taking a metaphysical position. How do you know they're irrelevant? I thought you were a skeptic. Obviously you're being inconsistent, irrational and arbitrary in your approach here.


Notice MA's claim--"Where there's a gap in knowledge, I do not fill that gap – I merely acknowledge the gap." Maybe it’s just me, but this sounds like an early admission in our debate to the un-justifiability and irrationality of MA’s moral theory. As the debate continues I think MA will be unable to account for many of the ideas that underlie his moral theory.

Here’s one of those ideas: free will. On what grounds will MA account for this idea? He claims his position is based in “methodological naturalism.” But from that standpoint man would seem to be little more than a complex set of physiological processes, acting themselves out within a physical body by way of conditioned responses. Why, then, should society hold individuals responsible for their actions? That would seem patently unfair. But perhaps the idea of “fair-ness” is also irrelevant to MA’s moral scheme. In that case, we should ask if he is proposing any kind of prescriptive morality at all—i.e. a morality that deals with oughtsand shoulds. He may just opt for a descriptive morality, describing it as one might describe other occurances in nature like the migratory flights of birds, or the water cycle, or the motion of atoms.

Here’s another idea for MA to wrestle with: human dignity. This is something that, it seems to me, must have a place in any moral system. Otherwise why should humans distinguish themselves from the animals in their dealings with one another—or why should they even distinguish themselves from insects, trees and rocks in this regard? Using the rules of strict empirical and naturalistic methodology I’d like to know how MA accounts for this dignity. Will he simply deny its relevance to our discussion on morality?

MA, I’m asking you to declare to us whether your moral theory is prescriptive or descriptive. Then perhaps I can understand better where you’re coming from. If it is prescriptive I'd like to know the basis for its application on other human beings? In other words, tell me why you think I and everyone else should adhere to this morality you're proposing.

I’d also like you to address some of the metaphysical questions I’ve raised or at least explain how they are irrelevant to your moral theory.

In his opening statement Ron mentioned certain “metaphysical presuppositions” that he subscribes to in his worldview. They are:

*I exist.
*Other minds exist.
*An external world exists.
*Cause and effect.
*Axioms of logic.

He then added, “I remain skeptical on metaphysical claims that do not add to the equation or are completely arbitrary.” Okay, so I’d like to know why he thinks the presuppositions he’s listed should be deemed “useful”? Is it because they comport with his already pre-conceived way of reasoning? That seems pretty subjective and unjustifiable to me. And why are all other metaphysical claims deemed un-useful and unknowable? How can he, as a metaphysical skeptic, make such dogmatic claims? He’s being both hypocritical and irrational, on the one hand censoring all metaphysical claims and calling them “irrelevant” and on the other hand saying that he has no knowledge about them (which would include a knowledge as to their usefulness and value in this present debate). He says further that such metaphysical claims “do not add to the equation.” What the heck does that even mean? What equation? How does he even know what the equation is if he’s claiming to be a skeptic?

It’s true Ron is free to take any position he likes. When I mentioned that he would have a hard time arguing from the standpoint of “metaphysical skepticism” I wasn’t demanding that he take another position. But I can tell you right now there’s no way he’s going to be able to defend himself if he keeps this up.

Ron says that in order for me to win this debate I must prove the following three premises:

(X equals a number of things, but in this case it refers to morality.)


Premise 1: The Christian worldview accounts for X.
Premise 2: No other worldview (in this case, metaphysical skepticism) accounts for X.
Premise 3: A worldview must fully account for X to be considered rational and consistent.

He puts the most emphasis on Premise 3, saying, “If this premise fails, Flowers, your entire argument falls apart at the hinges.” Actually, our debate involves a third criterion besides rationality and consistency—namely, justifiability. This was something we discussed before we started the debate and which Ron agreed to. A worldview might be able to account for some things, but if it cannot account for a lot of things then that would seem to make it less justifiable than a worldview that can account for a lot of things. I suspect that Ron’s position can’t account for anything. But to demonstrate that he and I would have to get into a deeper discussion about epistemology and metaphysics and the present debate is about morals so I’ll try to stay focused on that.

Ron mentions several different moral theories and demands that I prove that all of these are “inconsistent and irrational.” (Notice that once again he leaves out the criterion of justifiability.) I feel like I could rip apart each and every one of those theories, but he’s obviously just trying to direct me away from his own position and I’m not going to let him do that. I’m debating him on his moral theory, not someone else’s.

So what is his moral theory? He says,

“Because I'm a skeptic, I'm willing to accept that there might be transcendental moral laws (whether given by god, another source, or simple universal "laws"); however, I also accept that morality could be entirely natural.”

He seems to think that by saying this he will escape the difficulties inherent within his own moral theory. But his moral theory does not stand on hypotheticals. If he’s going to propose a moral theory then he’s got to give me something to work with. In other words, he’s got to provide me with some actual theory. Here is how he’s presented his theory thus far:

“I only assume "truth" from which that can be empirically verified to be "true." I rely on science, the scientific method, evidence, and methodological naturalism.”

I will continue to judge Ron’s moral theory on the basis of these empirically based rules. If he has a problem with that then he needs to adjust his position.

After all the huffing and puffing about my theory Ron finally—in the last two paragraphs of his rebuttal—gets around to articulating his own. In my first rebuttal I had asked him if he was proposing a purely descriptive kind of morality (which doesn’t try to tell us what’s wrong or right but just describes what we do) or a prescriptive morality (which does assume some kind of right-ness and wrong-ness, proposing oughts and shoulds for behavior). In my mind, this is where his moral theory utterly collapses. He apparently tries to hold to both kinds of morality.

Descriptive morality is a meaningless concept so it might as well not even be classified as “morality.” If all morality boils down to is descriptions about human behavior, then there is no categorical way to distinguish moral behavior from any other kind of behavior. So going to the bathroom would seem to be no less moral than standing up for social rights. Picking your nose would seem to be no more moral than feeding the poor. Reading a lousy novel would seem no more immoral than raping a 6 year old. No standard of morality is proposed if the moral system is just descriptive. All one can do is describe behavior in the way it happens.

So here’s MA’s moral theory as we have it so far. He says, “This is what people do: sometimes they go to the bathroom; sometimes they help the poor; sometimes they read lousy novels; sometimes they rape children.”

The prescriptive form of morality that Ron is proposing is no less problematic. In fact, it is totally subjective and relativistic, as he himself admits:

“As for prescriptive morality, one ought to do what one feels is moral; morality is simply respecting fellow man and is subjective. There is no definite moral system to which everyone should subscribe to, and different people have differing views on what is and isn't moral. But these all include what one sees as respect for fellow man.”

Thus we see Moral Atheist’s moral theory being reduced, first of all, to a meaningless form of “descriptive” morality, which—from a conceptual standpoint—cannot assert that any particular behavior is distinctly “moral” over against another behavior. Secondly, his theory has been reduced to pure subjectivism. Everyone should just do what he or she thinks is right. Ron qualifies this however, by saying that it should be based on “respect” for ones fellow human beings—a feeling we derive from evolution:

“I accept evolution, and for the most part this justifies morality in my worldview. I believe that sympathy, empathy, and respect for others are derived from evolution. Morality is a respect to fellow human beings. Moral people are moral because of this natural sympathy and respect.”

Alright Ron, so tell me why you feel sympathy, empathy and respect are good things. (I don’t think you’ll try to argue this from a purely subjective standpoint, will you?) Is it because you believe these feelings help with the survival of our species? Okay. But why should survival be the chief objective of morality? Is it more virtuous to survive than to die? I’d like you to explain how survival is itself a moral idea. I think most people would say it is a non-moral or a-moral concept. Your moral system would therefore seem irrational, founded as it were on an a-moral concept.

Moreover, many species have actually become extinct because their competitor species have figured out better ways to survive. This seems to be especially the case with us humans. The larger our population grows the more land we will require, the more certain species will be displaced, the more food we will have to eat, etc. All of this will make it more difficult for certain species to survive. What you also need to address therefore is why the survival of OUR species should be the chief objective of morality.

If our own species’ survival is detrimental to another species’ survival, then why should we get to survive and the other species die? What makes us more deserving? You’ve already tossed out the idea of human dignity so you can’t appeal to that. You seem to be left with nothing but pure arbitrariness and ruthlessness. Think about it. If someone or something is viewed as a threat to our survival, then what will become of all your wonderful notions of sympathy, empathy and respect? Won’t they be tossed out the window? They will certainly be tossed out, not just as these ideas would apply to other species but as they would apply to members within our own species as well. And this just raises another problem in your moral system—

Even if I agreed that survival should be the main objective for morality, it’s not clear to me how a more sympathetic, empathetic and respectful humanity would be more apt to survive. Prove to me, with empirical science, that a more respectful society will ultimately produce more offspring than a non-respectful society. Or prove to me even from history that sympathetic, empathetic and respectful societies have managed to survive better than others that were non-sympathetic, non-empathetic and non-respectful. I actually think the societies that have dominated and populated the world most effectively have been those that were the most cutthroat and un-sympathetic—the ones which have tried to undermine, overpower and suppress other societies and even the weaker members of its own society. Just look at the world today. America is the world’s super-power and it maintains its status quite ruthlessly, extinguishing its competitors by any selfish means permissible. China and India are both booming economies, mainly because of human exploitation—unfair wages, no child labor laws, oppressive work requirements, etc. Meanwhile traditional communist and socialist societies (and I don’t really consider China a traditional communist society because of its capitalist tendencies in the last few decades), which are in theory founded on sympathy, empathy and respect, end up crumbling within a few years or being commandeered by some ruthless dictator.

Ron skirted the idea of free will in his first rebuttal so I’ll bring it up again. I’d like to know, first of all, how he accounts for this idea on purely empirical grounds as his theory requires. If he cannot show that human beings even have free will then what else could he be but a determinist? As a determinist he will have no basis for morality at all because all behavior will then (from his criterion of “methodological naturalism”) be regarded as nothing more than natural physiological processes, the result of environmental factors and stimulus response mechanisms acting on the individual. There can’t be anything moral or immoral about our behavior if that’s all he’s got to work with.

I suppose at this point he’ll say: there may or may not be such a thing as free will, but I’m a metaphysical skeptic and don’t have to account for that. Here’s what he wrote in his first rebuttal:

“I remain skeptical on metaphysical claims that do not add to the equation or are completely arbitrary. I make no reference to these claims in my worldview as they are irrelevant … You see, I don't have to make any sort of metaphysical "commitment;" I am under no such obligation.”

Of course, saying this doesn’t make it so. He does actually need to make some sort of commitment on free will, otherwise—as I just explained—he will have no justification for proposing a moral system. Without free will behavior can only be determined. People should therefore be regarded as neither virtuous nor vicious, good nor bad, moral nor immoral. They are simply be acting out their destiny. There would be no reason for holding criminals accountable for their actions; no reason for outrage when a person is murdered; no reason for commending someone for doing “the right thing.” To affirm morality within a worldview that cannot account for free will is irrational, inconsistent and unjustifiable.

But Ron isn’t convinced that my worldview can account for morality either. He asks me to answer the old Socratic question:

“Does God command us to behave morally because it is good, or is behaving morally good because God commands it? Is God subject to some form of objective morality, or is morality completely subject to God's will? If it's the latter, then morality cannot be objective. If it's the former, then what is God for?”

Christian morality is defined by the character of God. God doesn’t command it because it is moral or good. He doesn’t have to appeal to something outside of Himself like that. Behavior is deemed moral because it corresponds with His character. God’s eternal, unchangeable character is itself the standard. He doesn’t invent, create or fabricate morality artificially or arbitrarily as human beings like to do. I suppose He could do that if He wanted to since He’s God, but that’s not my position. I say He actually commands morality because it corresponds with His character.

Ron also wants to know how I can talk about God’s revelation being “distorted” and “obscured” on account of human sinfulness and still maintain any knowledge about morality. He says my position is at this point “irrational and unjustifiable.” It’s not actually. It might seem subjective at first glance because I appeal ultimately to personal faith and divine illumination. But there’s a lot more to my argument than that. Having taken the divinely illumined revelation of God as a basic presupposition behind my worldview I contend that my worldview is internally rational and consistent, while all other worldviews (like yours) are irrational, inconsistent and unjustifiable. This is how I argue my worldview over against others. It’s not pure subjectivism therefore.

Now, because I’m a limited human being I can’t possibly argue against every worldview that has ever been or ever will be proposed. That is why the “transcendental argument” I’m making can never be regarded as a “proof.” Epistemic certainty for the Christian worldview must ultimately rest on faith and the internal witness of the Holy Spirit. But again, this isn’t pure subjectivism. While I may not be able to examine every worldview, I can examine many of them. And whenever I show an opposing worldview to be unjustifiable, irrational and inconsistent and my own to be the opposite, I am providing an objective argument for my position. Presently, I’m examining your worldview and finding it to be full of all kinds of holes. I’m also finding the arguments your making against my worldview are invalid. This debate is therefore serving as a kind of objective validation for the Christian worldview. I know this is difficult for you to realize but I won't let you direct me away from your worldview. If you want a more thorough and wide-ranging refutation of other non-Christian worldviews I can provide you with a bibliography. But this debate is about you and me, not me against Plato or some Joe Shmo who claims to have seen Jesus riding a Santa sleigh.

Okay, I'll get back with you tonight probably when I get home from work.

You’re apparently asking these questions because you’re hoping to find some weakness in my worldview. But remember that this debate is about you being able to demonstrate that your worldview is rational, consistent and justifiable. Let me remind you of the rules:


1) This is a debate about … whether or not morality is justifiably accounted for in MA's worldview, but even more importantly, whether or not MA's worldview is a rational one. (MA only has to defend his worldview--he is under no obligation to attack Michael's.)


And here’s the resolution for this debate, mentioned in the original post:


The resolution for this debate is … on the rationality, consistency, and justifiability of morality from Moral Atheist's worldview. MA is free to attack the worldview of Michael Flowers, but is under no such obligation (as Flowers is the one who asserts that MA's worldview is not rational, consistent, or justifiable concerning morality).


Okay, so now let me answer your questions.

“Free will” is a personal, self-actualized power within an individual. There may be inducements and other external forces that prompt it to behave in certain ways, but its power is such that it may also transcend those external forces and exhibit another quite different kind of behavior.


According to Christianity God is omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent. These concepts are defined for us in and by Scripture.

“Divine illumination” is the inscrutable way in which God “opens our eyes”—that is, heals our sense and reasoning faculties so that they are more competent and so that we human beings are more willing to understand and accept God’s revelation for what it is, despite our sinful and corrupted nature. One attains illumination by grace, that is, the unmerited favor of God. It is a subjective event but it can be rationally and objectively defended because it provides the necessary pre-conditions for all the things we take for granted and find meaningful in life. Without relying on divine illumination and revelation from the Christian God human beings are found to destroy any basis for epistemology, metaphysics and MORALITY. The fact that you, Moral Atheist, cannot provide a consistent, rational and justifiable theory of morality is evidence that you need to rely more on divine illumination and not your own autonomous reasoning skills.

Thank you for continuing to talk, Ron; for in so doing you have inadvertently handed me the keys to your own defeat. Once again you’ve shown that your worldview is quite irrational, inconsistent and unjustifiable. I’ll demonstrate that later. For now, though, let me handle the fallacious arguments you’re leveling against my worldview.

Ron sets up a dilemma for Christians who affirm both God’s omniscience and free will in humans:

If God is omniscient and has foreknowledge then it follows that God knows every single occurrence that will ever happen to you for the rest of your life. From this, for example, God knows what will happen to you tomorrow. Likewise, God knows what decisions you will make tomorrow.

So when tomorrow arrives, you only have ONE course of action that you can take: the course of action that God already knows you will take. As such, you do not have the ability to do otherwise. Because you do not have the ability to do otherwise it follows that you do not have free will.

Ron says the problem he’s raising here is “possibly the largest flaw” in my worldview. He seems to think Benjamin came up with the argument. Actually it’s been around for a long time. It has also been refuted by many theologians. But that’s all beside the point. Here’s why the argument is bunk.

Ron is confusing two distinct concepts: certainty and necessity. These are clearly not the same thing. Because God is omniscient or all-knowing, it was indeed certain that Judas, for example, would betray Jesus; but there is no reason to say that Judas’ act was also necessary. If it had been necessary then obviously Judas could not have done it freely—for necessity implies that he could not have acted otherwise even if he had chosen to. On the other hand, if Judas’ act was only certain then it could still have been committed freely. If you don’t believe me on this then perhaps an illustration will help you better understand:

Despite my own limited knowledge, I can be reasonably certain how a hungry dog will behave under certain kinds of circumstances. For example, if I wave a juicy steak in front of its mouth, I can be reasonably certain it will grab the meat and eat it. Would the dog be acting out of compulsion in this case simply because I was able to anticipate its behavior? No indeed. My being reasonably certain about the dog’s behavior and the behavior itself have no causal relationship.

Apply this illustration now to God. Bear in mind one important difference, however—namely, that God’s knowledge is infinite. Since He is omniscient He would be able to know and predict an individual’s behavior under any set of circumstances and with absolute certainty.

There is nothing irrational or logically inconsistent therefore about maintaining both the doctrine of divine omniscience (and the certainty of all human behavior that this doctrine implies) AND the ability of human beings to act freely. God did not coerce Judas into betraying Jesus, so he could have acted otherwise; but He did predict Judas’ betrayal before it happened, so it was absolutely certain that it would take place.

Foreknowledge really poses no more of a problem to free will than a knowledge of someone’s past behavior does. I know from my study of history that Judas betrayed Jesus. Does my knowledge of this historical fact imply that Judas did not commit the act freely? Of course not. Nor does God’s knowledge of any future behavior imply that that the behavior cannot be committed freely. Again, there is no cause and effect relationship between the simple knowledge of someone’s behavior (whether it be past, present or future) and the modality for carrying out that behavior (i.e. free will).


Ron didn’t like my response to the "Euthyphro dilemma." He complained that, “Appealing to God’s "nature" is no different than appealing to his "will." ” He said, moreover, that any human being (e.g. Ron himself) could appeal to his own nature and that that would provide him with just as much of a claim to objective morality as an appeal to God’s nature would. I think Ron is making a false analogy here. For one thing human beings all share the same nature. Why, then, should one human being’s nature be touted as a standard for all morality? That would be totally arbitrary because nothing sets that human being apart from other human beings (at least not if he’s just appealing to his nature). Thus, other human beings could make a similar appeal to their nature and challenge his moral claims.

I understand objectivity as something transcendent—i.e. beyond what we are and thus something that we can all point to as an authority. Because God is metaphysically distinct from us and because He is ontologically and morally superior to us, He can Himself be the objective standard for humanity for whatever issues concern us—in this case morality. There is no higher court of appeal outside of God.

Ron doesn’t have to accept my claims about God being metaphysically distinct and ontologically or morally superior to human beings in order for what I’m saying to have relevance to his argument. I know he doesn’t even believe in God. But that doesn’t matter right now cause he’s supposedly challenging the internal coherence of my worldview. I’m just explaining how my worldview is consistent and accounts for objective morality. The problem with Ron’s worldview, of course, is that it affords him no basis for objective morality at all. I guess he’s tried to assert such a thing by appealing to some common “feeling of respect” among humans, but the way this “feeling” gets expressed in moral codes of behavior varies, sometimes quite radically from culture to culture and even person to person. For him, therefore, all there can ever be is relativistic morality which—if challenged by another individual or culture—will seem to be totally arbitrary and unjustifiable.


Ron also raises the so-called “problem of evil.” He sets up the following syllogism:

1. If God is perfectly loving, He must wish to abolish evil
2. If He is all powerful, He must be able to abolish evil
3. Evil exists
4. Therefore, an all powerful, loving God does not exist.

I disagree with the first premise. It does not logically follow that if God is perfectly loving He must wish to abolish evil. I challenge Ron to show that the logical inference he has built into his first premise is itself logically inferable.

I’d also like to know on what grounds he’s making this moral charge against God. In particular, I’d like to know where he is getting his definitions for “perfectly loving” and “evil.” Is he importing them from his own worldview? How can he do that since his worldview provides no basis for talking about objective morality? Doesn’t he claim that morality is just a social construct that varies from person to person? So how can he accuse God of being immoral? Maybe he’s getting his definitions from the Christian worldview. In that case he’s following the rules of our debate, but he’s going to have to define his terms in the way Christianity itself defines them. Therefore, he’s still got no basis for raising an objection. For God’s character of love is not understood in the Christian worldview as something that is incompatible with evil.


Ron says that if I can’t refute every other worldview that this somehow justifies his own. I completely fail to understand the logic behind this assertion. Here are his exact words:

You then later make this cl.. "Now, because I’m a limited human being I can’t possibly argue against every worldview that has ever been or ever will be proposed. That is why the 'transcendental argument' I’m making can never be regarded as a 'proof.' " By admitting this, you immediately justify my own worldview. If there exists even one worldview that is internally consistent, rational, and justifiable outside of the Christian worldview, then my worldview is justified.

Obviously Ron is creating a false dilemma. If it can be shown that another worldview exists which is internally rational, consistent and justifiable then I admit this would undermine the transcendental argument. But I do not admit that the existence of such a worldview would justify his worldview. That would be like saying, “If I can show that the number 8 is divisible by 2 and not just by 4, then I may infer from this that 8 is also divisible by 3.”

Okay, now let me critique Ron’s worldview some more.

First, although this may only deal indirectly with his moral theory, let me explain how Ron’s metaphysical presuppositions and the epistemology it gives rise to have no rational foundation. He says his own existence and the axioms of logic are self-evident; for they are fundamental and irrefutable; and if they were rejected no one could even debate. He’s assuming here that the world is rational, but I find nothing in his worldview to warrant this assumption. His worldview discounts (i.e. deems irrelevant) metaphysical things like mind, free will, person-hood, God, angels, or the soul. Ron is a functional materialist. All he can appeal to therefore is physical matter. With such a foundation, as I said, I find no reason for him to assume the world is rational. I’d like to hear him explain not THAT the world is rational, but WHY it is rational. Where’s the rationality in a bunch of atoms moving around and bouncing off each other? I also see no reason for him to presuppose the axioms of logic, for his worldview provides him no basis for thinking they are useful. He simply assumes they are because he wants to make sense of his existence, debate and that sort of thing. This is also the reason he believes in cause and effect. He says it’s useful to believe in this. Well, I admit that, but why should anyone care about usefulness? I find nothing in his worldview that would lead him to believe that the world is intelligible, so what’s the point in talking about usefulness?

He then says “Other metaphysical claims … are not useful.” Haha. They may not seem useful on the surface, but when you start delving more deeply into matters of epistemology you find they come in pretty handy. As a metaphysical skeptic all he can appeal to in order to justify his presuppositions is the material universe—i.e. only those things that are empirically verifiable. Again, that’s why I say he’s a functional materialist. His worldview and the moral theory he has constructed collapses on its own terms.

Ron contends that he does not necessarily have to make a FULL account of morality in order to have a consistent, rational and justifiable worldview. I said in my last rebuttal that if my worldview accounted for a lot more things than his, then his would seem less justifiable than mine. I thought that was a reasonable argument. But Ron didn’t like it. I’m cool with that. I mean, I’ve got nothing to lose if I throw out the argument cause it’s pretty obvious that Ron’s worldview can’t account for morality AT ALL.

Ron declares, “my position of metaphysical skepticism rests on the idea that no single moral theory … can be proven to be the "only" rational, [consistent and justifiable] moral theory.” This reasoning, of course, begs the question entirely. My whole argument, as a matter of fact, is built on the idea that without a proper metaphysical understanding one cannot maintain a rational, consistent and justifiable moral theory. In this debate I’ve challenged him to falsify this argument by showing how his own worldview is actually rational, consistent and justifiable or simply that mine is not. So far he hasn’t done that. If he can’t do it then I will have succeeded in offering a rational argument for Christianity. But if he’s going to demand “proof” then he’s barking up the wrong tree cause I’ve never claimed that the transcendental argument PROVES anything. Ultimate epistemic proof (i.e. assurance) comes by way of faith.

Ron and I are obviously coming at this debate from two radically different worldviews, each with its own basic commitments that cannot be proven (e.g. my faith in the Christian God, Ron’s belief that “truth” must be empirically demonstrable). So how can we adjudicate between these two worldviews? Shall we just sit in our respective corners and call one another heretics? Perhaps I should adopt his position of methodological naturalism and strict empiricism and then argue my worldview on those terms? Yeah, right! I wouldn’t expect him to adopt a metaphysical position such as mine and argue his worldview on those terms. So what are we to do? I say the only way for people to resolve disagreements on their basic philosophical commitments is to do an internal critique, examining one another’s worldviews according to their own rules. Using the rules of his own worldview, I shall now demonstrate that Ron is completely incapable of maintaining or even proposing morality.

Here is how Ron’s “metaphysical skepticism” undermines morality. For one thing, it leaves him with no way of talking about free will (since this is a metaphysical concept). It therefore strips away any personal aspect of behavior. Think about it. If we can only judge behavior from the criterion of methodological naturalism then behavior can only be attributed to impersonal natural forces (e.g. chemical reactions, environmental stimulations, etc.). To speak of human behavior as being either “moral” or “immoral” is therefore a misnomer. At base it is just natural phenomena occurring within the physical universe. As such, it can be lumped into the same category as other natural phenomena such as earthquakes, the migration of birds, the growth of trees, the falling of snow, and the shifting of tectonic plates.

DESCRIPTIVE "MORALITY"

It’s not surprising that Ron and other atheists like him typically prefer only to describe morality. But when they do this they are really just preaching anthropology and cloaking it in the pseudo-garb of morality. Such “morality” does not propose any norms for behavior. Nor does it propose any values. It simply describes behavior as it is exhibited among certain individuals. Descriptive morality is therefore ultimately non-moral or a-moral.

Descriptive morality does not even allow one kind of behavior to be distinguished conceptually from any other kind of behavior—whether it be going to the bathroom, blinking ones eyes, torturing children, drinking milk instead of water, twiddling ones thumbs, humming, or stealing money from an elderly woman. It’s all just behavior after all. Calling any particular behavior “moral” or “immoral” would therefore be inappropriate, or, I should say, irrational, inconsistent and unjustifiable (since norms and values are not actually being prescribed but only described). Imagine if someone described the motion of planets in our solar system and in so doing claimed to have discovered some kind of planetary morality. Would people not say he was being irrational? But that’s precisely what Ron is doing when he talks about descriptive morality and pretends he’s actually talking about morality. What a joke! It’s as if he were offering to sell me apples and handing me a bag full of oranges.

So much, then, for descriptive morality. It is clearly a meaningless concept, providing Ron with absolutely no foundation for morality. Does Ron offer us anything else? Yes, he explains his theory of prescriptive morality as follows:

RON'S PRESCRIPTIVE "MORALITY"

Prescriptive morality … is the idea of what one ought to do in a given situation, rather than the study of what one actually does. As I said before, one ought to do what one must, with a consideration of respect for others.

This is classic. What is the reason a person ought to be moral? “One ought to do what one must”, he says. And why “must” one do anything? Hmm. He doesn’t seem to have an answer for that.

Ron doesn’t want us to think he’s prescribing just any kind of behavior. I’m sure he thinks genocide, for example, is immoral. This is why he says morality always rests on some kind of “respect for others.” He also adds that human beings derive this feeling of respect naturally, through evolution. This, of course, is an entirely unjustifiable claim since his worldview provides him no way of knowing more generally that other human beings actually have this feeling of respect. He simply assumes they do. But perhaps the feeling only shows up in certain individuals like Ron. Perhaps it skips several generations, as dwarfism or albinoism do. I suppose in theory Ron could take a poll of all the people alive today and ask them whether they have feelings of respect for others. But such an endeavor would be highly impractical. Besides, the poll results could be distorted as poll results always are. Besides, the results would not take into account whether people in the future will continue experiencing feelings of respect for others. Perhaps we will all evolve into sadists. What then will become of Ron’s respect-based morality that derives itself from evolution?

Also, how does Ron’s worldview even allow him to know whether the feelings of respect he experiences are qualitatively the same as someone else’s feelings of respect? Maybe they come in different shades like skin tones. Or maybe he experiences these feelings more strongly in certain situations while others feel them more strongly in other situations. It seems to me that feelings of respect are not so much based on genetics, but on culture and circumstances. These feelings would therefore be highly relativistic and situational. As such, they would be no more universally applicable than any other culturally-based emotion or behavior.

I asked Ron why he thought sympathy, empathy and respect were “good” things and things that people should build their moral theories on. I suspected he would say that these feelings were good and useful in establishing morality because they ultimately help our species survive better; so I pointed out that survivability is not itself a moral concept. In his rebuttal, however, Ron tried to steer clear of saying that survivability is the basis for his moral theory. Of course, I still think it’s implicit in much of what he says. But I’ll play along. What, then, does he propose in the place of survivability? Answer: NOTHING! He says, “evolution and survivability are not why I consider these things good. They are good because that is what they are.” In other words, he is now offering us no rational foundation for his moral theory. He’s just asserting that certain kinds of behavior are good because he thinks “that is what they are.” Well who is he to make this pronouncement? Does he think he’s better than anyone else if he’s challenged on it? But wait … that’s not all. He doesn’t want us to forget that “morality is a respect for fellow human beings.” Hence, “respect is necessarily good.” Mmm. Sounds like a circular argument to me. I challenge anyone to make sense of Ron at this point. Here’s his entire statement:

You ask me why sympathy, empathy, and respect are "good" things. You then assume that it's because they help with the survivability of our species. However, evolution and survivablity are not why I consider these things good. They are good because that is what they are. Because, as I've stated, morality is a respect for fellow human beings. Therefore, respect is necessarily "good." Sympathy and empathy are "tools" to be used in determining what is and isn't respectful, and are likewise "good" as well. That they are derived from evolution is irrelevant. Survival isn't, in and of itself, a moral idea--rather, morality is an idea that arose out of survival! We could describe how dice are created, but this description of their creation is irrelevant in how the dice are used. The objective of morality isn't survival; morality is the result of survival (evolution).

You’re really going to have to clarify what the heck you mean by this Ron. Simply stating that “morality is respect for human beings” isn’t going to help because that’s just an arbitrary assertion on your part. Besides, if you’re going to say morality is a cultural construct then you’ll have to account for behaviors that certain cultures deem “moral” which have nothing to do with respect for others. For example, many cultures oppress women and claim to do so for moral reasons. Our own culture kills unborn babies and heralds this as a moral act (since it is an existential “choice” on the part of the woman). There are also many religious and superstitious practices performed by hermits that are deemed “moral.” For example, in the early days of Christianity there were many desert ascetics who would abstain from sleep for many days or remove all protective clothing and sit in the blazing sun for hours in order to attain some higher form of morality.

I want to know, Ron, why any kind of behavior should be deemed moral, that is, good or bad. If it’s not because certain behavior promotes or inhibits our survival then what is it?

Do you think that there is any objective to morality at all? You seem to believe that it’s non-teleological:

The objective of morality isn't survival; morality is the result of survival (evolution).

If morality has no objective then it seems your attempt at maintaining prescriptive morality has ultimately failed. You are right back where you were, incapable of doing anything more than describing behavior as it happens and noting how—for some reason that your worldview can’t justify—cultures distinguish “moral” behavior from other kinds of behavior.

I posted that in two parts for easy access and readability. You don't need to thank me for that.

Okay, the rebuttal round is over and now it's time for Michael Flowers and Moral Atheist to submit their concluding statements.