Can you be wrong about how happy you are?

Okay... I'll be the first to respond.

I take the question to be "Is it possible that an agent could have an occurent belief B regarding the degree to which she is happy, and that B is inaccurate?"

First of all, let's restrict our assessment to human agents (of the sort we meet in the actual world). Sure, it seems logically possible that an agent could be thus mistaken; however, that kind of analysis would take us a bit afield from the focus of this group.

Next, as stated in my rephrasing of the question, let's stick to occurrent beliefs. Different answers may be due to occurrent beliefs and non-occurrent beliefs for a given agent. For one thing, it's not entirely clear to me whether and to what extent non-occurrent beliefs are adjusted by new information, whereas occurrent beliefs may be more sensitive to changes in information.

Finally, although it's not really clear to me what happiness is, I'll start with the assumption that happiness is an affective state. This is a start, but it doesn't other relevant concerns. Does the affective state of happiness have to be occurrent? Does it have to be a conscious state? I don't know, but it's clear that the answers to these questions will have a bearing on the answer to our guiding question. After all, if happiness is an affective state that can be non-occurrent or unconscious, then it is much more plausible to answer that we can have a belief that is inaccurate respecting the degree to which we are happy. Regardless, perhaps we can safely elide these questions in our attempt to answer the guiding question by making the stronger assumption that happiness must be an occurrent, conscious mental state. If we can be wrong regarding the extent to which we are happy even while using these stronger assumptions, then it we can be wrong regarding the extent to which we are happy using less restrictive assumptions. So, for the purposes of addressing the guiding question, I am assuming that happiness is an occurrent, conscious, affective state of mind.

I suspect that, yes, a human agent can have an occurrent belief that is inaccurate with respect to the degree to which she is happy. It seems that an agent could, for instance, be self-deceived regarding the extent to which she is happy. Imagine that someone invested years of her life and significant financial resources into becoming a lawyer. There is significant incentive for her not to look for disconfirming evidence (such as contemplating other ways of life), or to exaggerate the evidence that she does have (such as overemphasizing the brief flickers of pleasure which really are present in her job), etc.

Aside from self-deception, it's not clear that our internal gauges are going to be perfectly accurate, or (perhaps more significantly) that our concepts that contribute to the belief that "I am happy to degree D, " are going to be perfectly well defined.

I'd like to bring up again, that I made some questionable assumptions in this post. So, even if someone disagrees with me about the the answers I gave on the basis of the above assumptions, those assumptions I made are likely to be too strong (which was the point -- to motivate the claim that we could be mistaken about how happy we are even on the stronger assumption). First, if we let in non-occurrent beliefs, then it seems much more likely that we could be wrong. Second, even if happiness is an affective mental state (let alone a mental state at all), it may be a very complex state composed of a set of related mental states; and if happiness is complex in this way, it seems plausible to suggest that it would be more difficult to gauge how happy one is. Third, it's not obvious that happiness needs to be occurrent or conscious; and if happiness need not be occurrent of conscious, then it is more likely that we can be wrong regarding the degree to which we are happy.

J.S. Mill, who did think of happiness along the lines of pleasure and pain, wrote the following:


"If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness." -- Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 2.


This seems to be an account of happiness that is related to a varied set of affective states; however, it is not identified with any particular state. Rather, it is a way of characterizing a life that is constituted by such states (more good/pleasurable than bad/unpleasant). I bring this up to point out a plausible, pre-existing account of happiness that seems to break free from the assumptions regarding occurrency and consciousness, and to a lesser extent that happiness is an affective state (it is rather a collection of such states, and a collection of mental states is not itself a mental state).

Anyway, this post is a bit sketchy on a lot of points and it makes some questionable assumptions (not all of which I agree with); hopefully, however, it will get the discussion moving.